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Supreme Court restricts attorneys"actions as debt
collectors
by David Weissman
In Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S.
Ct. 1489 (1995), the United States
Supreme Court held that the term
"debt collector" as used in the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988 ed. and
Supp. V) applies to a lawyer who
regularly tries to collect consumer
debts through litigation. This
decision allows a debtor to bring an
action against her creditor's attorney
for engaging in misleading, abusive,
or unfair practices.

Plaintiff alleges violation of
Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act
Plaintiff Darlene Jenkins
brought this suit against attorney
George Heintz and his firm for
alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("Act" ).
Jenkins had defaulted on a car loan
from the Gainer Bank. Heintz was a
lawyer at the firm that represented
the bank in its action to recover the
balance due on the loan. He wrote a
letter to Jenkins' lawyer claiming
that Jenkins owed the bank $4,173
for insurance on the car. The bank
had purchased this insurance on its
own, because Jenkins had broken
her promise to keep the vehicle
insured.
While Jenkins conceded
that she had agreed to keep the car
insured, she maintained that the loan
agreement specified coverage only
for loss or damage. The substitute
policy procured by the bank, she
1995-1996

argued, covered not only loss and
damage but also insured the bank
against her failure to repay the loan.
Jenkins thus claimed that Heintz's
letter violated the Act by attempting
to collect money not "authorized by
the agreement creating the debt,"
and by making a "false representation of... the.., amount ... of any
debt." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f(l),
1692e(2)(A).
The United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois dismissed Jenkins' suit for
failure to state a claim, holding that
the Act does not apply to lawyers
attempting to collect debts through
litigation. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling
that the Act does apply to litigating
lawyers. Jenkins v. Heintz, 25 F.3d
536 (1994). Because the Seventh
Circuit's decision conflicted with a
Sixth Circuit opinion (see Green v.
Hocking, 9 F.3d 18 (1993)), the
United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to settle this issue.
In an unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court sided with the
Seventh Circuit, holding that the Act
does apply to attorneys litigating
debt collection disputes.

First, the Act defines a "debt
collector" as one who "regularly
collect[s] or attempt[s] to collect,
directly or indirectly, [consumer]
debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6). Looking at the plain
language of the statute, the Court
determined that a lawyer who
regularly attempts to collect consumer debts through litigation
clearly falls within this definition.
Additionally, in 1986
Congress revised an earlier version
of the statute. The earlier version,
enacted in 1977, defined "debt
collector" so as to expressly exempt
lawyers from liability under the Act.
Specifically, the 1977 statute
exempted "any attorney-at-law
collecting a debt as an attorney on
behalf of and in the name of a
client." Pub.L. 95-109, § 803(6)(F).
The 1986 revision completely
repealed this attorney exemption.
The Court thus reasoned that
Congress must have intended for all
lawyers to be subject to the Act
when it revised the statute, since
Congress did not replace the
exemption with a narrower exemption for litigating attorneys.

Court looks to plain
language, revision of Act

Defendant argues for
implied attorney exemption

The Court based its
decision on two factors: 1) the Act's
current definition of "debt collector"; and 2) the congressional repeal
of the Act's exemption for lawyers.

Defendant Heintz nevertheless asserted that the Court should
imply an exemption in the Act for
attorneys litigating debt-collection
cases, including settlements. He
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based this assertion on three
arguments, each of which the Court
rejected.
First, Heintz argued that
applying the Act to litigating
attorneys would create results not
intended by Congress. For example,
the Act prohibits a debt collector
from communicating with a debtor
upon the debtor's request. Heintz
argued that a litigating attorney
would thus be restricted from filing
a lawsuit against a nonconsenting
debtor, since this process involves
communication. The Court, however, rejected this argument. It
looked to other language in the Act
that creates an exception to this
restriction for communications
notifying the consumer that the debt
collector intends to pursue a certain
remedy. The Court applied this same
reasoning to other possible "anomalous" results Heintz pointed to,
finding that various statutory
language resolved such conflicts.
Second, Heintz argued that
a statement made by Congressman
Frank Annunzio, a sponsor of the
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1986 amendment that repealed the
lawyer exemption, indicated that the
Act still would not apply to litigating attorneys. However, the Court
did not find Heintz's argument
persuasive. The Court looked again
to the plain language of the Act, and
found nothing to indicate any
exemption for attorneys. In addition,
the Court pointed out that some
Congressmen had expressed concern
when repealing the lawyer's
exemption, and had proposed
alternative language excluding
litigation activities. However, this
language was not enacted. Furthermore, Annunzio's statement was
made after the statute became law.
Thus, the Court reasoned, it could
not have been relied upon by other
legislators when voting on the Act.
Finally, Heintz called the
Court's attention to a "Commentary"
on the Act written by the Federal
Trade Commission's staff. This
Commentary stated that the Act does
not apply to attorneys or law firms
whose practice is limited to "legal
activities" (as opposed to "tradi-

tional debt collection activities").
The Court, however, refused to
assign significant weight to this
statement, because the Commentary
itself did not purport to be "binding
on the Commission or the public."
Also, the Court emphasized that
neither the Act nor any other
authority indicates that Congress
intended to allow the FTC to create
such an exception to the Act's
coverage, particularly an exception
so clearly outside of the express
language of the statute.

Court resolves circuit split
Having rejected each of
Heintz's arguments, the Supreme
Court resolved the split between the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits by
holding that the Act applies to
attorneys who are regularly involved
in consumer-debt-collection
activities, including litigation. Thus
the Court affirmed the opinion of the
Seventh Circuit, which reversed and
remanded the decision of the district
court.
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